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During the past 20 years or so, we have witnessed an impressive trend 
toward making the investment climate more welcoming for foreign direct 
investors. At the national level, the great majority of regulatory changes 
related to foreign direct investment (FDI) were in that direction, mostly in 
terms of opening more sectors to investment or reducing other market entry 
conditions and facilitating the operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
once established. In fact, countries have actively sought to attract FDI, 
establishing investment promotion agencies to do that and, among 
other things, using a range of incentives to lure MNEs to their shores. 
These national policies have been supplemented by international investment 
agreements (IIAs) which, in particular, enshrine the protection of investment 
in internationally-binding treaties and, in a number of cases, also 
VÌÊ}ÛiÀiÌÃÊÌÊLiÀ>â}ÊiÌÀÞÊ>`Ê«iÀ>Ì}ÊV`ÌÃÊvÀÊ
foreign investors. The result is an international investment regime which, 
V«>Ài`ÊÌÊÜ>ÌÊÌiÀiÊÜ>Ã]ÊÃ>Þ]ÊÎäÊÞi>ÀÃÊ>}]ÊÃÊµÕÌiÊÜiÊ`iÛi«i`]Ê
even in the absence of a multilateral investment treaty. It is enforced, 
moreover, through an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism 
that is increasingly used by firms that seek to enforce what they see 
to be their rights. 
This dominant trend of the past two decades or so is certainly still 
continuing—but there are signs that the pendulum is swinging back. 
What is happening and why is it happening? [1]  
[1]   For an in-depth discussion, see Karl P. Sauvant, “Driving and countervailing forces: a rebalancing of national 
FDI policies,” in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008-2009 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 215-272.




has monitored changes in the national framework for FDI since 1992, 
reported that 94% of all regulatory changes during the period 1992-2002 
were in the direction of making the investment climate more welcoming, 
i.e. only 6 % of the regulatory changes were unfavourable to MNEs. That 





no data are available on the extent to which unchanged laws and regulations 
are implemented in a more restrictive manner, increasing informal barriers 
to entry and operations in a discriminatory manner. Overall, some 40%
… to national restrictions….
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vÊÜÀ`ÊÊyÜÃÊÊÓääÈÓääÇÊÛÛi`ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÌ>ÌÊ>`Ê«iiÌi`Ê>ÌÊ
least one regulatory change that has made the investment framework less 
welcoming—an impressive figure that demonstrates quite convincingly that 
something is afoot.[4]
Why this change in national FDI regulatory frameworks? There are, first of 
all, rising concerns about national security or, broader, national interest. 
“National security” and “national interest” are typically not defined, i.e. these 
VVi«ÌÃÊ>ÀiÊ«iÊÌÊÌiÀ«ÀiÌ>Ì°ÊÊÌiÊV>ÃiÊvÊÌiÊ1-]Ê>`ÊiÃ«iV>ÞÊ
after 9/11, national security involves primarily (but not only) military security, 
and therefore focuses on the protection of sectors that are important from 
that perspective, including as regards “critical infrastructure” (also 
undefined). In Europe, the concerns are more of a political and economic 
nature, involving FDI from Russia (and, perhaps in the near future, from 
China) and, more broadly, the protection of national champions. And in 
some emerging markets, national security or national interests are seen 
primarily in economic terms, involving especially sectors of key importance 
to the country’s economic development, sectors governments would want 
to protect from foreign ownership (e.g. China, Russia).
But other factors are at work as well. In particular, firms from emerging 
markets have entered the world FDI market in force and are becoming 
formidable competitors.[5] To be sure, there have always been MNEs based 




developed country counterparts, MNEs from emerging markets increasingly 
enter host countries through mergers and acquisitions (M&As). These bring 
them often to the attention of the public, part of which looks with suspicion 
at the “new kids on the block.” The discussion that surrounded the 
acquisition of Arcelor by Mittal (apparently considered by some an Indian 
firm because its CEO is from that country, although the firm is not Indian)—
which at times even appeared to have racist overtones à la “who do they 
think they are?” [6] —is indicative. This attitude becomes ever more acute 
when emerging market investors are state-controlled entities (be it 
state-owned enterprises or sovereign wealth funds) and from strategic 
competitors (China, Russia) or countries political allegiances, rightly or 
wrongly, might be seen to be in doubt (Gulf countries), as it is surmised that 
their M&As may be driven by political rather than commercial objectives. 
This issue may become even more important as traditional MNEs are less 
in a position to invest abroad on account of the financial crisis and 
recession, while sovereign investors may be less handicapped and, 
perhaps, snap up assets at fire-sale prices (as traditional investors did in the 
countries affected by the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s). 
Indicative of this may be that China’s outward FDI—80-90% of which 
consists of sovereign FDI [7]Êp`ÕLi`ÊLiÌÜiiÊÓääÇÊ>`ÊÓäänÊ­vÀÊfÓÈÊ
LÊÌÊfxÓÊL®Ê>`Ê>ÞÊÜiÊ>ÛiÊÃÕÀ«>ÃÃi`ÊÌiÊ>ÌÌiÀÊw}ÕÀiÊLÞÊÌiÊ
middle of 2009.[8]
[2]  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008: Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge (Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 2008). [3] James X. Zhan, “Recent global trends: FDI flows, TNCs and policies” (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2008), 
mimeo. [4] Sauvant, Yearbook, op. cit., pp. 215-272. [5] Karl P. Sauvant with Kristin Mendoza and Irmak Ince, eds., 
The Rise of Transnational Corporations from Emerging Markets: Threat or Opportunity? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2008). [6] See International Herald Tribune, June 27, 2006.  [7] See Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma, “China’s outward 
FDI: past and future” (July 2007), p. 15 online: http://www.nber.org/books_in_progress/china07/cwt07/cheng.pdf. 
These figures do not include state-owned enterprises administered by regional governments. 
[8] Kenneth Davies, “While global FDI falls, China’s outward FDI doubles’, Columbia FDI Perspectives, no. 5, 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, available at www.vcc.columbia.edu.











Finally, at least when the commodities boom was in full swing, a number 
vÊ>ÌÕÀ>ÊÀiÃÕÀViÊ«À`ÕV}ÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ­iÃ«iV>ÞÊÊ>ÌÊiÀV>®ÊÀ>Ãi`Ê
the question of the distribution of benefits associated with FDI in natural 
resources in their countries and, accordingly, sought to increase their “take.” 
It is not only that the regulatory framework is becoming less welcoming. 
Part of the changing attitude toward certain types of FDI is that screening 
mechanisms for FDI are being resurrected or strengthened. Such screening 
iV>ÃÃÊÜiÀiÊµÕÌiÊVÊ`ÕÀ}ÊÌiÊ£Çä]ÊVÕ`}ÊÊ>ÊviÜÊ
`iÛi«i`ÊVÕÌÀiÃ°ÊÕÀ}ÊÌiÊÃÕLÃiµÕiÌÊLiÀ>â>ÌÊ«iÀ`]Ê
most of them were either abandoned or re-oriented toward becoming 
investment promotion agencies. In the new climate for FDI, however, they 




have risen from 55 in 2001 to 165 in 2008, and investigations from 1 to 22.[9]
(It is not known how many projects did not go ahead because firms did 
ÌÊÜ>ÌÊÌÊ}ÊÌÀÕ}ÊÌiÊ
1-Ê«ÀViÃÃ°®ÊÊ«>ÀÌVÕ>À]ÊÌiÀiÊÃÊ>Ê
presumption that M&As by sovereign investors, be they state-owned 
enterprises or sovereign wealth funds, are subject to an investigation, 
ÕiÃÃÊ>Ê«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÊÌÀ>Ã>VÌÊÃÊiÝ«VÌÞÊiÝi«Ìi`°Ê7>ÌÊÌÃÊÀiyiVÌÃÊÃÊ
Ì>ÌÊÌiÊ1-Ê>ÃÊº`ÃVÛiÀi`»ÊÌ>ÌÊÌÊÃÊÌÊÞÊÌiÊÜÀ`½ÃÊÃÌÊ«ÀÌ>ÌÊ
home country (and hence has an interest in protecting the rights of its 
enterprises abroad), but that it is also the world’s most important host 
country and hence wants to protect its own interests vis-à-vis foreign 
direct investors. The fact that it has been the respondent in a number 
of investment disputes was important in this respect, as is the rise of 
FDI from emerging markets and especially the growth of sovereign FDI.

1-Ê>ÞÊÜÀÊÜiÊÊÌiÊ1-ÊVÌiÝÌÊÊÌiÊÃiÃiÊÌ>ÌÊÌÊ>ÞÊ`ii`ÊvVÕÃÊ
only on transactions that are directly relevant to national security (although 
the lack of definition of this term introduces an unpredictability factor) and 




screening mechanisms may well be used for a broader set of objectives 
(especially given a different approach to what the national interest is), 
and/or the interests of different parts of the government may not balance 
each other. It would be surprising, if governments across the world would 
ÌÊ>À}ÕiÊÌ>Ì]ÊvÊÌiÊ1-]Ê>ÃÊÌiÊÜÀ`½ÃÊÃÌÀ}iÃÌÊiVÞ]ÊviÌÊÌÊ
necessary to protect itself from certain forms of FDI, they would not have to 
do the same – in light of their own (typically not precisely defined and 
circumscribed) paramount objectives, of course.
[9] See Karl P. Sauvant, “Is the United States ready for FDI from China? Overview,” in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Investing in 
the United States: Is the US Ready for FDI from China? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, forthcoming).
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ÜÊ}ÛiÀiÌÃÊÃiiÊÊ>ÌÊÌiÊ>Ì>ÊiÛiÊ>`ÊÀi>VÌÊÌÊÌ]ÊvÕÀÌiÀÀi]Ê
ÃÊLÕ`ÊÌÊyÕiViÊÜ>ÌÊÌiÞÊ`Ê>ÌÊÌiÊÌiÀ>Ì>ÊiÛi]Ê>ÃÊÀiyiVÌi`ÊÊ
the international investment agreements they sign. Over 2,600 BITs have 
been signed so far, apart from some 250 free trade agreements that have 
substantial investment chapters (and, therefore, are really free trade and 
investment agreements). Such agreements continue to be signed, with an 
overwhelming emphasis on the protection of FDI and, in a growing number, 
ÌiÊLiÀ>â>ÌÊvÊiÌÀÞÊ>`Ê«iÀ>Ì>ÊV`ÌÃ°Ê
In the new climate, the orientation of international investment agreements is 
LÕ`ÊÌÊV>}ip>`]ÊÊv>VÌ]ÊÃÊLi}}ÊÌÊ`ÊÃ°Ê}>]ÊÌiÊ1-ÊÃÊ
leading the way, as a comparison of its 1994 and 2004 model bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) shows.[10] Among the many changes that limit 
somewhat the rights of investors and increase the rights of the host country, 
it is particularly noteworthy that a number of protections of foreign investors 
were scaled back in the 2004 model (especially regarding indirect 
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment). What is even more 
«ÀÌ>Ì]ÊÌiÊ1-ÊÜÊÃÃÌÃÊÊ>ÊÃivÕ`}}ÊiÃÃiÌ>ÊÃiVÕÀÌÞÊV>ÕÃiÊ
ÊÌÃÊÌiÀ>Ì>ÊÛiÃÌiÌÊ>}ÀiiiÌÃ]Ê°i°Ê>ÊV>ÕÃiÊÌ>Ì]ÊvÊÌiÊ1-ÊÀÊÌÃÊ
treaty partner declare that they deem their essential security interest to be 
involved, allows them unilaterally to set the terms of the agreement aside, 
«ÀiÃÕ>LÞÊ>ÌÊi>ÃÌÊ>ÃÊ}Ê>ÃÊ>Ê«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÊÃÌÕ>ÌÊ>ÃÌÃ°Ê iÜiÀÊ1-Ê
ÌiÀ>Ì>ÊÛiÃÌiÌÊ>}ÀiiiÌÃÊÀiyiVÌÊÌÃÊ>««À>V°Ê"ÌiÀÊVÕÌÀiÃÊ
are bound to follow this approach as well - and in fact have done so.[11]
If this should occur on a larger scale (and would not be contained by arbitral 
decisions), the strong international investment law and policy regime that 
has been build would be in jeopardy. 
/iÊÓää{Ê1-Ê`iÊ	/ÊÃÊVÕÀÀiÌÞÊÕ`iÀÊÀiÛiÜ°ÊÌÊÜÕ`ÊÌÊLiÊ
surprising if it were to be further revised in the direction of strengthening 
the rights of host countries. Indicative of this new mood are hearings in 
ÌiÊ1-Ê
}ÀiÃÃÊÊ>ÞÊÓää]ÊvVÕÃi`ÊÊÌiÊvÜ}ÊÌÀiiÊµÕiÃÌÃÊ
in relation to the country’s BITs and free trade agreements (FTAs): “whether 
ÕÀÊ/ÃÊ>`Ê	/ÃÊ}ÛiÊvÀi}ÊÛiÃÌÀÃÊÊÌiÊ1Ìi`Ê-Ì>ÌiÃÊ}Ài>ÌiÀÊÀ}ÌÃÊ
Ì>Ê1°-°ÊÛiÃÌÀÃÊ>ÛiÊÕ`iÀÊ1°-°Ê>ÜÆÊÜiÌiÀÊÌiÊ/ÃÊ>`Ê	/ÃÊ}ÛiÊ
governments the ‘regulatory and policy space’ needed to protect the 
iÛÀiÌÊ>`ÊÌiÊ«ÕLVÊÜiv>ÀiÆÊ>`ÊÜiÌiÀÊ>ÊÛiÃÌÀÊÃÕ`Ê
have the right to submit to arbitration a claim that a host government has 
breached its investment obligations under an FTA or a BIT.” [12] What these 
µÕiÃÌÃÊ«ÞÊÃÊÜiÌiÀÊÌiÊ1-ÊÃÕ`ÊVÃ`iÀÊÃÕLÃVÀL}ÊÌÊÌiÊ
>ÛÊ
`VÌÀiÊ­ViÊ>`ÛV>Ìi`ÊLÞÊ>ÌÊiÀV>ÊVÕÌÀiÃ®Æ[13] whether host 
country rights should be strengthened further (the concept of “policy space” 
is a concept used by developing countries in the WTO to either avoid taking 
ÊViÀÌ>ÊÌiÀ>Ì>ÊL}>ÌÃÊÀÊÌÊLÌ>ÊÀiÊyiÝLÌÞÊÊ>««Þ}Ê
iÝÃÌ}ÊÀÕiÃ®ÆÊ>`ÊÜiÌiÀÊÛiÃÌÀÃÌ>ÌiÊ`Ã«ÕÌiÊÃiÌÌiiÌÊÃÕ`Ê«iÀ>«ÃÊ
be phased out in favor of State-State dispute settlement (as in the WTO).
[10] Kenneth J. Vandevelde, “A comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. model BITs: rebalancing investor and host 
country interests”, in Yearbook, op. cit., pp. 283-316. [11]  See e.g. the bilateral investment treaty between Japan and 
Laos, 2008. [12] Hearing on Investment Protections in U.S. Trade and Investment Agreements, United States House 
of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, May 14, 2009, http://waysandmeans.
house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=678. 
[13] According to this doctrine, aliens have no more rights than the citizens of a sovereign state. Accordingly, 
investor-State disputes need to be settled under domestic law by the court of the countries involved.
… and weaker international investment regime,…
“Do FTAs give 
foreign investors 
in the US greater 
rights than US 
investors”
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-ViÊ>LÕÌÊÌiÊ`£näÃ]Ê>ÊÃÌÀ}ÊÌÀi`ÊÌÜ>À`ÊÌiÊLiÀ>â>ÌÊvÊ
investment conditions at the national level and the strengthening of the 
«ÀÌiVÌÊvÊÛiÃÌÀÃÊ>ÌÊÌiÊÌiÀ>Ì>ÊiÛiÊV>À>VÌiÀâiÃÊÌiÊ
development of the international investment law and policy regime. 
This trend continues. Yet, there are clear and present indications of a 
re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of FDI and of the balance of rights 
and responsibilities of MNEs and host countries. At the national level, this 
re-evaluation expresses itself in greater reservations especially regarding 
incoming cross-border M&As, a regulatory framework for FDI that is 
becoming less welcoming in a number of countries and the resurrection 
or strengthening of national FDI screening mechanisms. At the international 
level, the international investment law and policy regime that had been 
established during the past two decades and that had acquired “teeth” 
through the investor-State dispute-settlement mechanism, shows signs 
of being weakened. 
Some of these developments are understandable or even desirable. 
In particular, host countries do need to be able to pursue policies that 
advance their own interests. At the same time, they cannot look toward FDI 
>ÃÊÌiÊ«ÀV«>Êi}iÊvÀÊÌiÀÊ}ÀÜÌÊ>`Ê`iÛi«iÌÆÊÃÕVÊÛiÃÌiÌÊ
can be a catalyst for growth and development, it can help and, in a few 
sectors, even make a crucial contribution – but the principal engine is, 
as a rule, a vibrant domestic enterprise sector. Similarly, the international 
investment law and policy regime – which, deliberately, had developed 
primarily with foreign investors in mind – needs to give more attention 
to the policy interest of host countries. There is a danger, though, that 
the rebalancing overshoots, especially through the use of unilateral 
protectionist measures and the application of the essential security clause. 
An FDI Protectionism Observatory that monitors and publishes—names 
and shames—FDI protectionist measures (both regarding inward and 
outward FDI) could be of help here.  
In the end, what is crucial is that the investment regime, both at the national 
and international levels, takes into account the interest of all stakeholders 
and, in particular, is clear and predictable so that investors, be they 
domestic or foreign, can securely plan ahead while host countries can 
pursue their own legitimate policy priorities. This involves a delicate 
balancing process, which, among other things, needs to check the 
rise in FDI protectionism.
…or a rebalancing of the FDI regime?
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